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OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
ROSENN, Circuit Judge.
The petitioner, Ronald Layne, appeals from the District Court’s denial of his
2petition for a writ of habeas corpus relief.  Layne pled guilty to felony murder before the
New Jersey Superior Court pursuant to a plea bargain agreement in 1983.  The court
conducted a plea colloquy which satisfied the court that Layne made the guilty plea
knowingly and voluntarily.  The court, however, did not advise Layne of the
constitutional rights to which he would be entitled if he stood trial, such as the right to be
tried by a jury, the right to confront his accusers, and the right not to incriminate himself. 
The court sentenced Layne in 1984 to life imprisonment with a 30-year period of parole
ineligibility.
After exhausting his remedies within the state system, Layne brought the
underlying federal habeas corpus action on the ground that he did not make his guilty plea
knowingly or voluntarily, that he was entitled to a withdrawal of his guilty plea because
of mental incompetence, and that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective.  The United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, Pisano, J., denied his habeas petition. 
We affirm.
I.
The following facts are undisputed.  On November 21, 1983, Layne commenced a
drive from New York to Maryland to receive his army discharge.  His vehicle broke down
in New Jersey.  He met Eric Beitia, the victim of his crime, at a nearby automobile service
center.  After striking up a conversation with Beitia, and discovering that they both came
from Panama and spoke the same language, Beitia agreed to give Layne a ride.  During
the ride, Layne drew a gun and ordered Beitia to stop with the intent to rob him of the
vehicle.  He bound Beitia, pointed the gun at him, and ordered him to exit the vehicle. 
According to Layne, Beitia made a sudden move while exiting the vehicle, which alarmed
Layne.  Layne then shot Beitia in the back of his head.  He dumped Beitia’s body from
3the vehicle and returned to New York with Beitia’s vehicle.  Beitia died six days later as a
result of the wound.  
Layne signed a waiver of indictment and, under an accusation, was charged with
attempted murder, aggravated assault, and felony murder.  Pursuant to a plea bargain
agreement, Layne pled guilty to felony murder.  The New Jersey Superior Court, Kramer,
J., conducted a plea colloquy on December 22, 1983, at which Layne was represented by
counsel.  After detailed questioning, the Court was satisfied that Layne made the guilty
1 The transcript of the relevant parts of the plea colloquy conducted by Judge Kramer of
the New Jersey Superior Court runs as follows:
THE COURT Thank you, all right, Layne, Accusation 876-12-8
charges you with murder.  More specifically the single
count recites that on November 21st, 1983, in the
Township of Mansfield in Burlington County, you during
the attempted commission of a robbery caused the death
of Eric Beitia who died on November 27th, 1983.  Do
you understand that this is the charge that we are talking
about?
DEFENDANT Yes, sir.
THE COURT Do you understand that Mr. Kuroishi [Layne’s attorney]
is telling me that you wish to enter a plea of guilty to that
charge?
DEFENDANT Yes, sir.
THE COURT Is anyone forcing you to do this?
DEFENDANT No, sir.
THE COURT In addition to what the Prosecutor and Mr. Kuroishi have
just said now, has anybody else promised you any deals
for pleading guilty?
DEFENDANT No, sir.
THE COURT You realize the maximum sentence that could be
imposed for this type of crime is life imprisonment plus
no parole eligibility for 30 years?
DEFENDANT Yes, sir.
THE COURT Do you understand that that is the recommendation that
the Prosecutor and Mr. Kuroishi is making?
DEFENDANT Yes, sir.
THE COURT All right, Are you guilty of this felony murder?
DEFENDANT Yes, sir.
Sra 210-11.
THE COURT All right.  Mr. Kuroishi has handed me this LR-28 legal
form which appears to contain your signature as well as
his.  Is this your signature?
DEFENDANT Yes, sir.
THE COURT And was Mr. Kuroishi present when you signed it?
DEFENDANT Yes, sir.
THE COURT All right.  Have you ever been in any sort of mental
institution?
DEFENDANT No, sir.
THE COURT Ever been in a hospital for treatment?
DEFENDANT No, sir.
THE COURT How long had you been in the army?
DEFENDANT Two years and a half, sir.
THE COURT All right.  I am satisfied that this is voluntary.  I will
grant the defense motion for the entry of a plea of guilty
to the Accusation.
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plea knowingly and voluntarily.1  The court, however, did not advise 
5him of the constitutional rights to which he would be entitled, such as the right to be tried
by a jury, the right to confront his accusers, and the right not to incriminate himself.
On the day before he was sentenced, May 2, 1984, however, Layne filed a pro se
motion seeking to withdraw his guilty plea and have another attorney represent him, or
alternatively to proceed pro se.  The court denied his application to withdraw his guilty
plea but granted his motion to proceed pro se.  The court directed his attorney to appear at
sentencing and represent him in case Layne changed his mind.  On the following day,
May 3, 1984, Layne appeared for sentencing.  Despite the previous day’s motion, he
asked that his attorney resume representation of him, stating that the attorney had done
“the best he could.”  Pursuant to the plea bargain, the New Jersey Superior Court imposed
a life sentence with a 30-year period of parole ineligibility.  Upon sentencing for the
charge of felony murder, the state dismissed the remaining charges contained in the
accusation, including the charge of attempted murder.
The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed the trial
court’s sentence, dismissing Layne’s argument that he had an intoxication defense to the
felony murder charge, citing his hospital records contained in his pre-sentence report. 
The Appellate Division also affirmed the trial court’s denial of Layne’s two motions for
post-conviction relief after hearings held in 1989 and 1996 respectively.  In the hearing
regarding Layne’s first motion for post-conviction relief in 1989, the New Jersey Superior
Court allowed Layne to call witnesses to develop his arguments that his plea was
involuntary and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  Layne, however, failed
to provide any relevant testimony and decided to forgo any further testimonial proof.  The
State moved to strike Layne’s testimony because of its inability to cross-examine him, and
defense counsel agreed.  The New Jersey Supreme Court denied Layne’s petition for
6certiorari on all three occasions.  
On August 14, 2000, Layne filed the underlying action for a writ for habeas
corpus with the United States District Court.  On March 5, 2002, the District Court issued
a decision and opinion denying the petition.  Layne’s appeal followed.
II.
The District Court had original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3) and
2254(a), and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  We have
summarized the new standard for the federal habeas court to review a state court’s factual
findings and legal conclusions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA) in Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 195- 96 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
532 U.S. 980 (2001) (noting that “AEDPA increases the deference federal courts must
give to the factual findings and legal determinations of the state courts”), and Appel v.
Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 2001).
Specifically, we have held that “[f]ederal habeas corpus relief is precluded as to
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in a state court proceeding unless such
adjudication . . . (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.”  Werts, at 196 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2) (1997)). 
“Factual issues determined by a state court are presumed to be correct and the petitioner
bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence.”  Id.
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (1997)).
A.
Layne argues first that he was deprived of his constitutional rights by the state
7trial court’s acceptance of his guilty plea because it was not made knowingly or
voluntarily.  Specifically, he argues that the court failed to advise him of the right to be
tried by a jury, the right to be represented by counsel, the right to confront his accusers,
and the right not to incriminate himself.  He argues additionally that the transcripts did
not show that he had waived any of these constitutional rights.  He cites Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969), and Stinson v. Turner, 473 F.2d 913 (10th Cir.
1973), in support of his argument.  
The Supreme Court stated in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747-48 n.4
(1970), that “[t]he new element added in Boykin was the requirement that the record must
affirmatively disclose that a defendant who pled guilty entered his plea understandingly
and voluntarily.”  Following that instruction, United States Courts of Appeals have
rejected the argument that Boykin required a formal enumeration of constitutional rights. 
Stinson v. Turner, 473 F.2d at 915-16, relied on by Layne, expressly rejected a similar
argument made by the petitioner there that the trial court must enumerate every single
constitutional right or privilege to which the petitioner was entitled in order to determine
that the petitioner’s guilty plea was made knowingly and voluntarily.  “[N]o procedural
requirement was imposed that [the constitutional rights] be enumerated.  The main
purpose is . . . to make sure [the accused] has full understanding of what the plea
connotes and of its consequence.”  Stinson, at 915 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Boykin, at 244).  We have similarly held that “[t]he ritual of the colloquy is but a
means toward determining whether the plea was voluntary and knowing” and that “the
failure to specifically articulate the Boykin rights does not carry the day for the defendant
if the circumstances otherwise establish the plea was constitutionally acceptable.”  United
States v. Stewart, 977 F.2d 81, 84-85 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 979 (1993). 
“[A] defendant has the burden of persuasion to establish that a plea was neither intelligent
8nor voluntary.”  Id.  
Under the above case law, Layne has failed to carry his burden of showing that his
guilty plea was not made knowingly and voluntarily.  On the contrary, even though the
trial judge did not enumerate every single constitutional right to which Layne was entitled
in the plea hearing, the record shows beyond doubt that Layne made his guilty plea
knowingly and voluntarily.  Moreover, hospital records pertaining to his mental
competence disclose that he understood the nature of the pleading process and the
consequence of pleading guilty. 
B.
Layne argues next that the denial of his request to withdraw his guilty plea was
unconstitutional.  He argues alternatively that he should be at least accorded a full
evidentiary hearing to assess the merits of his case.  He cites Heiser v. Ryan, 951 F.2d
559 (3d Cir. 1991), and United States ex. Rel. Culbreath v. Rundle, 466 F.2d 730 (3d Cir.
1972), among others, to support his arguments.
We agree with the District Court’s ruling against Layne’s arguments under the
three-factor test set forth in United States v. Huff, 873 F.2d 709, 712 (3d Cir. 1989). 
Pursuant to that test, the District Court noted that for the first time in nineteen years of
litigation Layne asserted his innocence, and his assertion was belied by his two voluntary
confessions of guilt, made prior to his guilty plea, and his knowing and voluntary guilty
plea.  Second, the court concluded that allowing withdrawal of the guilty plea would
prejudice the government because the crime occurred nineteen years ago.  Both the
government and Layne would experience difficulties in assembling evidence and
witnesses.  Finally, the court concluded that Layne’s reason to withdraw the plea was
weak.  Layne has failed to carry his burden of showing that the District Court abused its
discretion in applying the test.
9C.
Layne also argues that the state trial court’s acceptance of his guilty plea was
unconstitutional because he was mentally incompetent to plead guilty knowingly or
voluntarily.  Specifically, he argues on appeal that he was suffering from severe mental
difficulties during the period prior to the entry of his guilty plea, as evidenced by the
prescription that he take mind-altering drugs such as Mellarill, a powerful narcotic, to
prevent him from committing suicide.
The District Court rejected Layne’s assertion of mental incompetence. 
Specifically, the District Court noted that hospital records contained in the pre-sentencing
report showed that Layne was capable of understanding the nature of the pleading process
and that he understood the consequence of pleading guilty.  The Court noted further that
the hospital reports did not mention insanity or diminished capacity caused by the
medicine that the examining doctors prescribed to him.  Layne has not met his burden of
rebutting the evidence showing his mental competence at the plea hearing.  His taking
medications in itself does not show that he was mentally incompetent.  See United States
ex rel. Wiggins v. Pennsylvania, 302 F. Supp. 845, 848-49 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff’d, 430
F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1970).  We cannot say the District Court committed plain error or
abused its discretion in its ruling.
D.
Finally, Layne argues that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated and his
guilty plea was ineffective because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Specifically, he argues that his trial attorney, Dennis Kuroishi, was ineffective because he
made no effort to prepare a defense for him.  He maintains that all Kuroishi did was to
coerce him to plead guilty and that the attorney made no effort to investigate the viability
of a diminished capacity or an intoxication defense.  According to Layne, Kuroishi’s
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assistance was ineffective because he met only three times with Layne to prepare for trial,
did not formulate an adequate trial strategy, did not adequately review with Layne the
Government’s discovery or the case against him prior to the entry of the guilty plea, never
filed a motion to suppress Layne’s confession. and  made no effort to request a
competency hearing.
We agree with the District Court that Layne failed to satisfy the two-prong test set
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment rights requires showing of
serious incompetence in counsel’s performance and of prejudice to defense), and
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (“[t]here is a strong presumption that
counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of professional assistance”; the
petitioner must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (the two-prong test enunciated
in Strickland applies equally to uninformed guilty pleas that are alleged to be the result of
ineffective counsel).
The District Court ruled that Layne was unable to maintain his burden of showing
either incompetence or prejudice.  Specifically, the Court noted first that Layne failed to
produce any evidence showing that his trial attorney coerced him into pleading guilty. 
The Court concluded next that even if assuming that his attorney failed to “explain the
American jury system,” as alleged by him, this failure by itself would not have rendered
counsel’s performance unreasonable.  The Court noted further that Layne waived an
indictment and that the record showed that he and his attorney discussed the indictment
process at length.  The Court observed that Layne reviewed together with his attorney his
two voluntary confessions, along with other evidence gathered for the prosecution, and
11
that they discussed the possibility that he could get the death penalty if he was convicted
of the offenses with which the prosecution would have charged him.  
The Court concluded that Layne based his decision to plead guilty on the
overwhelming evidence against him and the possibility that he could receive the death
sentence.  The Court finally rejected Layne’s assertion that his counsel was ineffective for
failure to investigate and put forth an intoxication defense.  The Court noted that Layne
had twice voluntarily confessed to his crime and that he could have received the death
penalty had he not pled guilty and stood trial instead.  Under the circumstances, the Court
concluded that the trial attorney’s recommendation to plead guilty was not conduct below
the standard constitutionally required of attorneys.  The Court also opined that the
defenses of intoxication or diminished mental capacity would not have been effective,
even if asserted, because psychiatric evaluations had specifically found that Layne was
capable of standing trial.
III.
We perceive no plain error or abuse of discretion in the District Court’s judgment. 
We conclude also that the decisions of the New Jersey courts, which adjudicated the same
claims on the merits, do not result in “a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
Accordingly, the District Court’s judgment will be affirmed.
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TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
/s/ Max Rosenn, Circuit Judge 
